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ABSTRACT
Logic locking is amethod to prevent intellectual property (IP) piracy.
However, under a reasonable attack model, SAT-based methods
have proven to be powerful in obtaining the secret key. In response,
many locking techniques have been developed to specifically resist
this form of attack. In this paper, we demonstrate two SAT model-
ing techniques that can provide many orders of magnitude speed
up in discovering the correct key. Specifically, we consider relaxed
encodings and symmetry breaking. To demonstrate their impact,
wemodel and attack a state-of-the-art logic locking technique, Full-
Lock.We show that circuits previously unbreakable within 15 days
of run time can be solved in seconds. Consequently, in assessing
the strength of any given locking, it is imperative that these mod-
eling techniques be considered. To remedy this vulnerability in the
considered locking technique, we demonstrate an extended ver-
sion, logic-enhanced Banyan locking, that is resistant to our pro-
posed modeling techniques.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Due to prohibitively high research and development costs, only
a few foundries are manufacturing integrated circuits (ICs) in ad-
vanced technology nodes. Consequently, many IC companies tend
to operate fabless, relying on untrusted foundries to manufacture
their designs. Once a circuit is sent for fabrication, the foundry
gains full visibility of the design in netlist form with minimal ef-
fort, allowing IP theft. This threat undermines the significant cost
associated with developing digital circuits and is a growing con-
cern in the IC industry [9].
To combat IP theft, a variety of logic locking techniques have
been developed. These techniques add programmable elements to
the logic of a digital IC. When programmed incorrectly, the ele-
ments disrupt the circuit, obfuscating the true functionality. The
key, which correctly programs the elements, is stored in an on-chip,
tamper-proofmemory. This key is set post-manufacture, so the cor-
rect functionality is never revealed to the untrusted foundry.
Early examples of logic locking techniques inserted keyed exclusive-
or (XOR) and multiplexer (MUX) gates to corrupt the next-state
logic [12, 17]. Unfortunately, these methods have been largely bro-
ken using a variety of attacks, the most successful of which are
miter-based SAT attacks [21]. Researchers have attempted to in-
crease the difficulty of themiter-based attack by inserting resistant
logic blocks into the locked circuit.
These resistant locking techniques generally fall into two cate-
gories based on how they resist the miter-based SAT attack. The
first group [24, 25, 28, 29] focuses on reducing the number of keys
ruled out per attack iteration, significantly increasing the expected
number of iterations. In practice however, these techniques are sus-
ceptible to removal attacks since the circuitry is typically traceable
through properties such as signal probability or Boolean sensitiv-
ity [22, 26].
The second group [13, 18] tries to extend the time per iteration.
This is done by adding SAT-hard instances into the circuit. These
instances typically have many interdependent keys; a prototypi-
cal example is the lookup table (LUT) combined with configurable
routing. The resulting locks resemble field-programmable gate ar-
rays (FPGAs) embedded into the circuit and have been shown to
be highly resistant to the current miter-based SAT attacks.
In this paper, we explore the use of twomodeling techniques tar-
geting locked circuits from this second group. These techniques are
shown to be powerful tools in revealing the key, dramatically re-
ducing attack run time. Specifically, the contributions of this work
are the following:
• Proposal of relaxed encoding and symmetry breaking asmod-
eling techniques for attacking locked circuits
• Demonstration of impact of the modeling techniques in at-
tacking a state-of-the-art scheme, Full-Lock
• Logic-enhanced Banyan locking, an improved version of Full-
Lock, not susceptible to these new attack techniques
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Attack Model
In the characterization of the security of a locking technique, an
attack model is used to specify assumptions regarding the adver-
sary’s ability. In this paper, as in all the aforementioned locking
techniques, it is assumed that the adversary has access to two ar-
tifacts: the locked circuit’s netlist and an unlocked version of the
circuit. The unlocked circuit has the correct key set in its tamper-
proof memory, affording the attacker black-box access, commonly
referred to as an oracle. These artifacts correspond to the access
a foundry is likely to have when manufacturing a commercial de-
sign. The netlist can be easily reversed engineered from the design
data and the unlocked circuit can be obtained on the open market.
It is also assumed that the adversary has access to the unlocked de-
sign’s scan chains. While additional side-channel techniques may
augment an attacker, they are considered outside the scope of the
paper.
In general, the problembeing solved by the attacker is as follows.
The attacker has access to an unlocked circuit containing a set of
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Boolean functions. Each function, f : {0, 1}n+k → {0, 1}, has n
normal inputs and k unknown, fixed key inputs. The attacker also
has knowledge of the structure of f . Using the unlocked circuit and
knowledge of the structure, the goal of the attacker is to obtain a
functionally equivalent version of the circuit.
2.2 Propositional Satisfiability
A common approach to deal with hard combinatorial problems,
such as finding the key of locked circuits, is to encode them into
propositional logic and to solve the resulting propositional formu-
las with a satisfiability (SAT) solver. The performance of SAT solvers
improved significantly in the last two decades and they are used
formany applications in hardware and software verification [4, 11].
In recent years, SAT solvers have also been successfully applied to
various attacks, such as hash collisions [20] andmathematical chal-
lenges [14].
The typical encoding of the SAT problem is in the conjunctive
normal form (CNF). This form consists of a set of clauses that must
all be satisfied. Each clause is a disjunction of literals. A circuit can
be encoded into propositional logic via the Tseitin transformation
[23]. This transformation can take a circuit netlist and produce a
set of clauses which, when collectively satisfied, will correspond
to the original circuit’s behavior.
Themost successful class of SAT solvers are based on the conflict-
driven clause learning (CDCL) algorithm [2, 16]. Briefly, CDCL
solvers work by repeatedly selecting a variable through heuris-
tics and assigning a value. Implications from the assignments are
determined using a highly optimized process called unit propaga-
tion. If a conflict is found, a clause is added to the formula that
rules out assignments causing the conflict. Then the solver non-
chronologically backtracks based on the conflict and continues,
repeating this process until a solution is found or the problem is
found to be unsatisfiable.
2.3 Miter-Based SAT Attack
The above attack model enables the mounting of a more targeted,
miter-based SAT attack. This attack uses the netlist and unlocked
circuit to iteratively produce input-output (IO) relationships [21].
These relationships are used to rule out all keys that do not produce
the same behavior, narrowing the space of possible circuit function-
alities. The IO relationships are efficiently learned through a three-
step procedure: I. First, a miter circuit [6] is used to determine an
input that is guaranteed to rule out at least a single key. A miter
circuit consists of two copies of the original circuit with the inputs
tied together, the key inputs kept separate, and the outputs con-
nected to comparators. A diagram of the connections is shown in
Fig. 1a. Additional key constraints, such as timing and loop break-
ing, can be conjuncted with the miter output. A SAT solver is used
to find a setting of the shared input (I) and key inputs (K0,K1) such
that the output of the miter circuit is logic 1. By construction, the
solution to the SAT problem will have two different keys that, at
that input value, disagree on the output value. The shared input
value found by the solver is termed a differentiating input (DI). II.
Next, as depicted in Fig. 1b, the learned DI is applied to the ora-
cle circuit to determine the differentiating output (DO), forming
an input-output (IO) pair which the correct key must respect; any
Figure 1: Miter-based SAT attack steps: (a) Miter circuit con-
struction, (b) Unlocked (oracle) circuit produces correct IO
functionality (c) Addition of learned IO constraint to miter
circuit
key that does not conform to this IO pair is incorrect. III. Finally,
as shown in Fig. 1c, the IO pair is added as a constraint to the miter
circuit for the next iteration. Now, any keys that satisfy the miter
circuit will also satisfy the learned IO relationship. While each re-
lationship is guaranteed to rule out at least one key, in practice, a
larger portion of the key space is ruled out due to overlapping key
functionalities at a given input. These steps repeat, adding more
constraints until themiter circuit is unsatisfiable. At this point, any
key that respects all learned IO relationships will be a functionally
correct key.
2.4 Full-Lock
Full-Lock is a logic locking technique specifically developed to be
resistant to the miter-based SAT attack [13] via increasing the exe-
cution time of each iteration. This is done by integrating SAT-hard
logic into the circuit using a combination of routing obfuscation
and look-up tables (LUT). The added logic is highly symmetric
with many keys mapping to the same functionality. Symmetry is
known to be difficult for SAT solvers, trapping the algorithm by
spending time exploring solutions that are isomorphic [7]. Further-
more, unit propagation of the circuit is hindered as each configu-
ration depends on many keys: in order to determine the output of
the Full-Lock circuitry, most keys must be assigned. Finally, the
obfuscation is parameterized such that locking scheme’s clauses
to variables ratio is close to 4.26, the phase-transition density for
uniform random 3-SAT (SAT instances with exactly 3 variables
per clause) [8]. Intuitively, instances with a higher ratio are over-
constrained making contradictions easier to find and those with a
lower ratio are under-constrainedwith potentiallymany satisfying
solutions. While the instances produced by Full-Lock are not uni-
form random 3-SAT, and therefore likely have a different optimal
ratio, the locking still produces hard SAT instances.
Full-Lock utilizes configurable routing and LUTs to obfuscate a
set of gates and their corresponding input connections. The con-
figurable routing is implemented with Banyan networks, a class
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Figure 2: Full-Lock diagram. Each LUT replaces a gate from
the original circuit; the switch boxes permute and invert
their input signals.
of logarithmic networks, that permutes connections based on a
key [13]. The network is made up of a series of 2-input switch
boxes which connect the inputs to the outputs, either directly pass-
ing through or switched. Additionally, Full-Lock adds the ability
to invert the polarity of the signals in each switch box. Diagrams
of the switch boxes and overall network are shown in Fig. 2. The
specific Banyan network configuration used has 2 ∗ loд2(N ) − 2
stages where N is the network’s input width (equal to the number
of permuted lines). The Banyan network is almost non-blocking,
meaning that almost all input to output connection permutations
are possible.
The locking procedure is as follows. A set of gates with the de-
sired number of total inputs is randomly selected from the circuit.
A Banyan network is inserted into the circuit. The nets fanning
into the selected gates are randomly inverted and connected to
the network’s inputs. The selected gates are replaced with LUTs of
appropriate input size. The outputs of the network are connected
the LUT inputs such that under the correct key, each LUT will re-
ceive the original inputs with proper polarity. The key to the cir-
cuit is thus the concatenation of the LUT and network configura-
tion bits. The random selection of gates opens the possibility for
combinational loops to be formed in the circuit. This has no im-
pact on the circuit when the correct key is applied as all feedback
paths will be broken. However, if not ruled out, these loops will
corrupt the miter-based SAT attack. Several methods of building
loop-breaking key constraints have been developed to re-enable
the attack [19, 32].
As is, this locking method appears resistant to the miter-based
SAT attack. The authors of the original work ran the attack for 15
days without termination on instances with 32 circuit lines per-
muted. Additionally, the authors considered a removal attack. The
added circuitry is easily identifiable, even after synthesis due to the
key lines and regular structure. Despite this, Full Lock is also resis-
tant to a removal attack as the selected gates have been replaced
with LUTs and the correct interconnections and polarities of their
inputs are unknown.
3 MODELING TECHNIQUES
Critical to the performance of SAT solvers is the encoding of the
problem.Many problems becomehard for SAT due to a poor encod-
ing. Often the best encoding is found after trying several different
strategies [5]. Thus, when assessing the security of a locking tech-
nique, the encoding used can drastically influence the results. In
this section, we describe two modeling techniques that are widely
applicable to logic locking.We demonstrate the application of each
technique to the example locking method, Full-Lock.
3.1 Relaxed Models
Each iteration of the miter-based SAT attack satisfies the miter cir-
cuit while respecting the system model. The system model cap-
tures the potential behaviors of the locked circuit under different
keys and is encoded into propositional logic allowing the SAT solver
to generate meaningful inputs. However, the exact system model
can be difficult to specify or too complex for SAT solvers to effi-
ciently handle. Often, a close analog to the original behavior can be
captured with a much simpler encoding. Substituting the system
model can allow significant decreases in attack time, sacrificing
precision for reduced complexity.
Several factorsmust be consideredwhen building a relaxedmodel
for a locked circuit. First, the model’s variables do not all need to
directly map to system’s logic. In fact, the only requirement on the
variable mapping is that the inputs and outputs remain directly
mapped between the encoding and original system model so that
the produced DIs can be run on the oracle and the resulting DI-DO
pair can be added to themiter.Next, the relaxed model must be able
to produce a super-set of the input-output relationships under all
key values. Perhaps counter intuitively, specifying a super-set of
behaviors can be easier than the exact set. Finally, while the key
variables do not need to be directly encoded, there must be a map-
ping from the relaxed model back to a valid key configuration of
the original system.
An example of relaxed modeling is seen in TimingSAT [15], an
attack methodology for TimingCamouflage [31]. TimingCamou-
flage substitutes flip-flops with combinational logic delays. This
disrupts a naive attack strategy because a reverse engineered netlist
will be missing flip-flops that correspond to the correct functional-
ity. It is assumed that to obtain the system functionality, an attacker
must meticulously time the circuit and check all possible paths for
potential combination logic delays replacing a flip-flop. However,
TimingSAT simply substitutes a relaxed model, overestimating the
possible locations where a combinational delay may be used as a
flip-flop. In each potential flip-flop location, a MUX is inserted se-
lecting between a flip-flop or wire. The functionality is then deter-
mined using the standard miter-based SAT attack, solving for the
proper MUX settings.
A relaxed encoding can also be used to remove key interdepen-
dence. Often the functionality of a locked circuit will depend on
a large portion of the keys. To determine the output for a given
input, the SAT solver must branch on many of the key variables.
However, in some cases the functionality can be separated from
the key variables. This allows the functionality to be selected with-
out assigning all keys. An analogous example is encoding integers.
The typical circuit for handling integers is representing them with
binary numbers, however, to select an integer value all variables
representing the binary number’s bits must be assigned. For SAT
solvers, an often more efficient strategy is one-hot encoding. Here,
a value can be directly assigned by setting a single variable true
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Figure 3: Relaxed models for Banyan network
Figure 4: Edge-based and MUX-based encoding schemes for
the all-to-all model
(and unit propagating the others to false). In a similar sense a cir-
cuit functionality can be decoupled from the key bits, directly se-
lecting the functionality rather than assigning all key bits.
Using this relaxed encoding strategy, we consider our example
technique, Full-Lock. As previously established, the Banyan net-
work is a SAT-hard circuit due to its large amounts of symmetry,
key interdependence, and poor unit propagation behavior. Despite
its complexity, the functionality is very simple: the outputs of the
network are a permutation of the inputs. Due to the structure of
the network, some permutations are prohibited, and others can be
selected by multiple key settings. If we relax the encoding of the
network, allowing the prohibited permutations in our model, we
can significantly reduce the complexity.
We consider two relaxed models in place of the Banyan net-
work: all-to-all, wherein every input can be routed to every output,
and all-to-all exclusive, which additionally restricts an input to be
routed to only a single output. A diagram of these functionalities
is shown in Fig. 3. The correct key is in the set of functionalities
that the Banyan network allows, which is a subset of the all-to-all
exclusive model functionalities, and in turn, the all-to-all model
functionalities.
From a circuit designerâĂŹs perspective, the natural way to en-
code all-to-all functionality uses an N-to-1 MUX for each output,
similar to the structure depicted in Fig. 4a. This can be easily speci-
fied in a high-level language such as verilog, then synthesized to a
gate-level representation. The Banyan network in Full-Lock can
then be substituted for these gates. Just as in the typical miter-
based SAT attack, the circuit can then be encoded into SAT via
the Tseitin transformation. The all-to-all exclusive encoding can
be formed in the same fashion, adding circuitry to ensure that the
select bits of each MUX are different.
We also consider an edge-based strategy inwhich a key variable,
kio , is created for each possible input to output connection. A dia-
gram of this encoding is depicted in 4b. The CNF of the encoding
is shown below where xj is a variable representing a net j, I is the
set of nets fanning into the Banyan network, and O is the set of
nets in its fanout.
∧
i ∈I,o∈O
kio → (xi ↔ xo ) (1)
To ensure proper functional behavior we must also enforce that
each network output is only connected to one input. This can be
done using a cardinality encoding over the same variables as be-
low: ∧
o∈O
ExactlyOne({kio : i ∈ I }) (2)
The edge-based all-to-all exclusive encoding is created with the
additional clauses:
∧
i ∈I
ExactlyOne({kio : o ∈ O}) (3)
Running the miter-based SAT attack on these encodings will
produce the correct mapping from the network inputs to outputs.
Obtaining the corresponding key for the original systemmodel can
be done by finding a key that propagates the same paths in the
Banyan network. Our models allow a greater function space, but
with an encoding much more amenable to SAT solvers as we will
see in section 5.1.
3.2 Symmetry Breaking
Another modeling technique that is not entirely exclusive from re-
laxed encodings, but can be applied on its own, is symmetry break-
ing. In the context of SAT, a symmetry is defined as a permutation
of variable assignments which maps one solution onto another [1].
In the miter-based SAT attack, symmetry results from classes of
keys producing the same circuit functionality. All equivalent keys
will be equisatisifiable with respect to the miter circuit inputs. If
symmetry exists in the locked circuit, the attack will waste time
exploring isomorphic parts of the search space.
Symmetry breaking in the miter-based SAT attack context en-
tails ruling out all but one key from each equivalence class. Ide-
ally, this is done with minimal additional clauses being added to
the problem, otherwise the additional problem complexity may
outweigh any benefit. While not specifically labeled as symmetry
breaking, this strategy has been utilized in the key-sensitization at-
tack on Strong Logic Locking [27], wherein back-to-back key XOR
gates are converted into a single XOR.
Several examples of symmetry are seen in Full-Lock. In the Banyan
network, multiple keys produce the same permutations of the in-
puts on the outputs. Additionally, the keys which optionally invert
the switch box outputs are highly symmetric: all configurations of
these keys can be reduced to a single bit for each output specifying
whether it is inverted. Our relaxed models of the network already
remove these two symmetries. However, there remains a signifi-
cant amount of symmetry in Full-Lock’s LUTs.
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Table 1: 2-Input LUT Symmetries Under Permuted Inputs
K0 (I1, I0 = 0, 0) 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
K1 (I1, I0 = 0, 1) 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
K2 (I1, I0 = 1, 0) 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
K3 (I1, I0 = 1, 1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
By themselves, LUTs have no symmetric assignments, but when
coupledwith external circuitry, they can becomehighly symmetric.
This property is good for Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs)
wherein flexible configurations can help meet timing, power, and
area constraints, however, this flexibility hinders the miter-based
SAT attack as the same logical functionality can be specified many
ways.
Full-Lock allows the LUT-inputs to be permuted which creates
LUT configuration, input permutation pairs that are symmetric. In
Table 1, we show all the symmetric configurations of a 2-Input LUT
with the inputs permuted. Each group with more than one equiv-
alence is highlighted in a different shade of blue. Within the high-
lighted groups, permuting the inputs allows a single LUT configu-
ration to function equivalently to the others. Thus, only one LUT
configuration per group is needed. In the 2-input LUT case, only
4 out of 16 configurations are eliminated, however, as the input
width increases the number of symmetric configurations grows sig-
nificantly. For a 4-input LUT, there is over an order of magnitude
reduction in the number of remaining configurations.
Full-Lock’s input permutation symmetry can be broken by en-
forcing an ordering on the inputs connected to each LUT. This en-
sures that for every combination of inputs routed to a LUT, only
a single permutation is allowed, ruling out all unnecessary config-
urations. To create this ordering, we add a unary mapping of the
key variables of our edge-based encoding. For each LUT, where sio
is an auxiliary variable representing the unary mapping for a key
kio and OL is the ordered set of network outputs that connect the
LUT, we add the clauses in Eq. 4 to our solver.
∧
i ∈I,o∈OL
(kio → sio) ∧ (kio → ¬sio+1)
∧ (kio → si+1o) ∧ (sio → ¬si+1o)
(4)
4 LOGIC-ENHANCED BANYAN LOCKING
4.1 Overview
Based on our attack data in Section 5.1 and the results from the
original Full-Lock work, it is clear the Banyan network structure
creates an instance that is difficult for the miter-based SAT attack.
The strengths of the network are the large number of cycles it can
potentially create, the interdependence of keys, and the lack of in-
termediate outputs. However, with the proposed modeling tech-
niques, we have exposed holes in the original formulation. Here,
we describe a remedy based on breaking the assumptions of the
modeling techniques through the addition of logic internal to the
network.
Our locking technique, logic-enhanced Banyan locking, uses the
same Banyan structure as Full-Lock, however, the functionality is
extended beyond the simple invert and permute. This is achieved
by moving logic from the locked circuit into the switch boxes of
Figure 5: Diagram of circuit mapped to logic-enhanced
Banyan network. The original circuit is shown top-left, the
locked version bottom-right. The correct switch box func-
tion is highlighted in black, the decoy logic in gray.
the Banyan network. In the original Full-Lock switch box, two key
bits are used to optionally invert the lines passing through. Now,
we use these two key bits to select one of four possible functions
for each switch box output. One configuration produces the correct
function, the others are randomly generated decoy functions of the
switch box inputs.
A diagram of the new technique is depicted in Fig. 5. In this
small example, a 4-input Banyan network is inserted. Using the
switchbox outputs as reference points, gates from the original cir-
cuit are mapped to the Banyan network. Switch box outputs s0, s1,
and s2 respectively map to gates д0, д2, and д3. We show the in-
ternal logic of two of the switch boxes; the logic corresponding to
the original circuit highlighted in black whereas the decoy logic
is in gray. Input, i4 feeds through the top-left switch box and gate
д4 is mapped to the upper output of the bottom-right switch box.
The network’s un-mapped inputs and outputs are connected to the
surrounding circuitry
As the network size is increased, it incorporates a larger portion
of the design. Since there is already a significant amount of recon-
figuration, we forgo the use of LUTs. The intra-network logic pro-
hibits the use of a simplified model for the network. The correct
functionality is no longer just a permutation of the inputs to the
network, but rather one of a very large space of functionalities de-
pendent on nearly all the key bits. Additionally, the large amount
of symmetry has been removed; while some corner case symmetry
may remain, it will be highly complex to find and probably of little
value to rule out.
4.2 Insertion Algorithm
While resistant to the modeling techniques, the insertion of the
Banyan network is more complex than in Full-Lock. Now, gates
from the original circuit must be mapped onto the structure of the
, , Joseph Sweeney, Marijn J. H. Heule, and Lawrence Pileggi
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Figure 6: Comparison of encoding schemes for standalone Banyan network, n=10
Banyan network, instead of just being randomly selected. We au-
tomate this process to enable scalable exploration of the mapping
solution space. To augment the ability to map onto the Banyan
structure, we split all gates from the original circuit with three or
more inputs into two input gates. We start with a Banyan network
of the desired input width,W and encode the problem of finding
a mapping as a SAT instance through constraints that we specify
below.
The encoding uses a set of variables representing a mapping
between an original gate д and a banyan switch box output s . The
switch box outputs provide a reference point within the Banyan
network that naturally correspond to gate outputs in the original
circuit. For all pairs of gates in the original circuit and switch box
outputs in the Banyan network, (д, s) ∈ C×B, we create a mapping
variablemдs . The variable is true if gate д is mapped to switch box
output s . Over these variables, we encode constraints that ensure
the amount of mapping is sufficient. First we ensure at least W
gates are mapped to the network.
AtLeastW ({
∨
s ∈B
mдs : д ∈ C}) (5)
Then we encode that at most one gate is mapped per switch box
output. ∧
s ∈B
AtMostOne({mдs : д ∈ C}) (6)
We allow multiple switch box outputs to map to the same gate
enabling themapping of gates with fanout. Finally, we prohibit any
path directly feeding through from the network inputs to outputs,
avoiding the simplest mappings. This is done by prohibiting a gate
to bemapped to both the first and last layer of the Banyan network.
We show the encoding below where Bi and Bo are respectively the
sets of switch box outputs in the first and last layers of the network.
∧
д∈C
∧
si ∈Bi
∧
so ∈Bo
AtMostOne(mдso ,mдsi ) (7)
To maintain the structure of the circuit, we add constraints that
enforce a correspondence between the connectivity of the mapped
gates and the switch box outputs. If a gate is mapped to a switch
box output, the fanin of the gate in the original circuit must be
mapped to the fanin of the switch box (i.e. the switch box outputs
from the preceeding network layer). Similarly, we also ensure that
at least one of the gate’s fanout is mapped to the fanout of the
switch box. We allow an exception to this rule if the gate is sim-
ply fed through the switch box, which adds flexibility to the circuit
structures which can be mapped. Note that here we are allowing
feed through for a switch box, but prohibit it through the entire net-
work. More formally,mдs implies that every fanin of д is mapped
to the fanin of s or, in the case of a feedthrough, д itself is mapped
to the fanin of s . This encoding is shown below.
∧
s ∈B
∧
д∈C
∧
дf ∈f anin(д)
mдs →
∨
sf ∈f anin(s)
mдf sf ∨mдsf (8)
Additionally, mдs implies that at least one fanout of д is mapped
to the fanout of s or, in the case of a feedthrough, д is in the fanout
of s . This encoding is shown below.
∧
s ∈B
∧
д∈C
mдs →
∨
sf ∈f anout (s)
∨
дf ∈f anout (д)∪{д }
mдf sf (9)
This system of constraints is solved and the gates in the result-
ing mapping are inserted into their corresponding switch boxes
and removed from the original circuit. The other MUX inputs are
connected to randomly selected decoy functions of the switch box
inputs. The network inputs and outputs are connected depending
on which gates have been mapped to the first and last layer of
switch boxes. It’s important to emphasize that no intermediate con-
nections are made to or from the network. Outputs with no map-
ping are randomly connected to remaining gates such that they
have no impact on the logic of the system under the correct key.
5 ATTACK RESULTS
In this section, we provide experimental data to show the effect
of using the proposed modeling techniques. We step through each
part of ourmodeling process, showing the incremental results from
each. We then demonstrate the resistance of our proposed tech-
nique to the miter-based SAT attack.
All attacks are run using a Python implementation of the miter-
based SAT attack. The implementation uses PySAT’s wrapper for
the CDCL-based SAT solver CaDiCaL [3, 10]. Additionally, the at-
tack implementation uses incremental addition of constraints as
proposed in [30]. Although Python is not as efficient as c or other
low-level languages, most attack time is spent inside the SAT solver
Modeling Techniques for Logic Locking , ,
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Figure 7: Attack time comparison of encoding schemes for
Banyan network with 2-input LUTs connected to the out-
puts, n=10
and thus the difference is negligible. The logic-enhanced Banyan
locking implementation can be found in our repository1
Each attack has a timeout 4 of hours, an iteration count of 10,
and is executed on a machine with 756GB RAM and 16 2.1GHz
cores. The attacks are conducted in parallel while ensuring mini-
mal contention for resources by allotting memory greater than the
maximum usage of the largest instances to each run.
5.1 Relaxed Model Comparison
We assess the impact of the model and encoding on attack run
time for the standalone Banyan networks. We compare five model,
encoding schemes as described in Section 3.1, namely the origi-
nal Banyan network model and encoding, and all combinations
of MUX-based and edge-based encodings with the all-to-all and
all-to-all exclusive models. We also compare our logic-enhanced
Banyan locking. For each iteration we randomly select a new key.
The data is shown in Fig. 6. We report several dimensions: overall
attack time, number of attack iterations, number of key variables,
number of total variables, and number of clauses.
Immediately obvious is the grouping of attack times. The orig-
inal and logic-enhanced Banyan networks respectively timeout at
input widths of 64 and 16. Whereas the attack time of all proposed
model-encoding pairs is significantly less, highlighting the impact
of the improved models. The number of iterations completed for
the original and logic-enhanced Banyan models remain low, a tes-
tament to the hardness of the problems. While the edge-based en-
coding has significantly more key variables, the overall variable
and clause counts remain close to the MUX-based encoding’s val-
ues. Both encoding schemes result in larger formulations than the
original Banyan network, however are significantly easier to solve.
The MUX-based all-to-all exclusive encoding stands out as by far
the largest relaxed encoding.
1https://github.com/jpsety/logic_enhanced_banyan_locking
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Figure 8: Comparison of attack time at network input width
of 32 between encodings with and without LUT symmetry
breaking, n=10
We then add the output LUTs to the Full-Lock network models
and repeat the attacks, reporting just the execution time in Fig.
7. Again, for comparison we show our proposed logic-enhanced
Banyan locking scheme. Here we can clearly discern that the edge-
based all-to-all encoding performs the best, quickly terminating
even with an input width of 256. For reference, this scenario would
require the original Banyan network 5,889 keys to implement (two
thirds of which are dedicated to inversions as in Fig. 2).
5.2 Effect of Symmetry Breaking
Next, we demonstrate the impact of the LUT symmetry breaking
on attack time. Since the amount of symmetry scales with LUT
input size, we sweep this parameter and hold the network width
fixed at 32. The resulting attack times with and without symmetry
are shown in Fig. 8. As the LUT width increases, the advantage
of symmetry breaking grows exponentially. At a LUT input width
of 5, the difference in attack time about an order of magnitude.
This result is consistent with the difference in potential solutions
reported in section 3.2.
5.3 Full-Lock and Logic-Enhanced Banyan
Attack Results
Finally, the proposed techniques are together applied to Full-Lock.
We use the best encoding from the previous results: an edge-based,
all-to-all exclusive with symmetry breaking along with the Cyc-
SAT acyclic constraints [32]. This is compared to the attack model
outlined by the Full-Lock authors: the full Banyan network model
alongside the CycSAT acyclic constraints.We also demonstrate our
proposed solution, logic-enhanced Banyan locking. All techniques
are run on the ISCAS85 benchmark circuits, sweeping the network
input width from 8 to 64. The corresponding key widths range is
around 64 to 1088. The results are shown in Fig. 9.
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Figure 9: SAT-based attack time for ISCAS85 circuits locked with Full-Lock and logic-enhanced Banyan locking schemes
The Full-Lock run times show a trend that mostly agrees with
the original results with the exception that some circuits at 32-
input width are deobfuscated. These improved results are likely
due to the use of a different SAT solver. Our relaxed model shows
run times several orders of lower than the original paper. Most
circuits at 32-input width (around 448 key bits) are deobfuscated
in seconds, with some outliers taking minutes, clearly demonstrat-
ing the effectiveness of these techniques. As the input width scales
to 64, many circuits are still deobfuscated, but the majority take
longer than our 4-hour timeout.
The logic-enhanced Banyan scheme provides a significantly bet-
ter ratio of key bits to attack time than the Full-lock predecessor.
At an input width of 16, the attack times out for all circuits. While
this is good, we do not suggest that such small input widths are
viable locking techniques as simple enumeration attack schemes
may easily deobfuscate them.
6 DISCUSSION
Our experiments show that these modeling techniques are highly
effective. The actual attack times for the original Full-Lock imple-
mentation are unknown, we just have a lower bound. With this,
we can claim that the techniques have decreased attack times by
at least several orders of magnitude. Important to the success of
our strategy was trying different models of the system.
Several concerns remain unexplored. First, the amount of cor-
ruption produced by the remaining keys after the miter-based SAT
attack has been run for some time. It is common to only report at-
tack run times, however, the keys that can be obtained at timeout
may be very close to a correct solution. Understanding the trend
in remaining corruption is critical information for a given locking
scheme. Also, an attacker can often specify constraints on the keys
that the correct solution must respect. One applicable example is
timing constraints, wherein every valid key must produce a circuit
with a critical path less than the period. Just like the acyclic con-
straints that are necessary for the attack to complete, timing con-
straints could rule out significant portions of the key space. Impor-
tantly, like our modeling techniques, encoding has a large impact
on effectiveness of a constraint.
More specific to our proposed technique, an overhead analysis
has not been conducted. It is likely that more must be done to
make this a viable solution for high speed designs. Towards that
end, a parameter exploration of similar structures may produce in-
creased attack resistance. Our initial implementation maintained
the amount of keys from Full-Lock. Varying the amount of keys,
connectivity of the network, or decoy logic selection may produce
significantly overhead and attack resistance results.
7 CONCLUSION
Wehave proposed twowidely-applicablemodeling techniques that
can substantially decrease the attack time for logic locking schemes.
Any locking scheme that has human-comprehensible regularities
is potentially vulnerable to these techniques.We have demonstrated
the application of these techniques on a state-of-the-art locking
scheme, Full-Lock. The experiments show many orders of magni-
tude decrease in attack time compared to previously reported re-
sults. In general, these modeling techniques are essential consider-
ations in any logic locking technique.
Additionally, we have described logic-enhanced Banyan lock-
ing, an extension to the Full-Lock method, that appears to be re-
sistant to these modeling techniques. We demonstrated promising
initial attack results, showing that structure of the Banyan network
combined with randomly selected decoy logic is not only a mech-
anism of resisting these techniques, but also harder for the CDCL-
based SAT solver used. Of course, this resistance may change with
some additional insight or varied attack strategies.
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